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 2. Constantine N. Katsoris is the Wilkinson Professor Law at Fordham University 
School of Law.  Constantine N. Katsoris – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-
2bioPP.ihtml?id=507&bid=29. 
 3. Jill E. Fisch is the T.J. Maloney Chair of Business Law at Fordham University 
School of Law and, at the time of this Lecture, was the Director of the Fordham 
Corporate Law Center.  Jill E. Fisch – Biography, http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/ 
fisch/main.htm. 
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Association Hires Stuart J. Kaswell as Executive Vice President and General Counsel 
(Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://www.managedfunds.org/downloads/MFA%20Hires 
%20Stuart%20J%20%20%20Kaswell%20as%20EVP%20and%20General%20Counsel.
pdf. 
 5. Steven M. Cohen is Counselor and Chief of Staff at the Office of the New York 
State Attorney General.  Steven M. Cohen – Biography, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ 
senior_staff.html. 
 6. Harvey Miller is a Senior Partner in the Business Finance & Restructuring 
Department of Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP.  Harvey Miller – Biography, http:// 
www.weil.com/harveymiller. 
 7. Gretchen Morgenson is the Assistant Business and Financial Editor and 
columnist at The New York Times.  Gretchen Morgenson – Biography, http://topics.ny 
times.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/gretchen_morgenson/index.html. 
 8. Richard Neiman is the Superintendent of Banks for the New York State 
Banking Department.  Richard Neiman – Biography, http://www.banking.state.ny.us/ 
biorhn.htm. 
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WELCOME 
DEAN TREANOR:  Good evening, everyone.  My name is Bill 
Treanor.  I’m the Dean of Fordham Law School.  It’s my pleasure to 
welcome you tonight to the Eighth Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture 
on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law. 
As you know, our topic tonight could not be timelier: “The 
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown and the Global Financial Crisis.” 
I have to say I am just stunned by the quality of the panelists.  I 
know we’re going to have a great discussion. 
We actually are on a great roll in this room.  The last event that we 
had here was last week, when we had Justice Breyer11 and Justice 
O’Connor12 speaking about judicial independence, with the Chief 
Justice of Ghana13 in the first row.  And we made today’s Times 
editorial page.14  So that’s the standard.  But I know this group will be 
able to achieve even better things.  It’s
One of the things that we are proudest of at Fordham Law School is 
our incredible business law program.15  We are ranked in the top twenty 
 9. Giovanni Prezioso is a Partner in the securities and corporate law practice of 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.  Giovanni P. Prezioso – Biography, http:// 
www.cgsh.com/gprezioso. 
 10. Muriel Siebert is the Founder, Chairwoman, and CEO of Muriel Siebert & Co., 
Inc.  Muriel Siebert & Co., Muriel Siebert: First Woman of Finance, http://www. 
siebertnet.com/html/body_mickie.html. 
 11. Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 
– Biography, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf. 
 12. Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States – Biography, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf. 
 13. Georgina Theodora Wood, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic 
of Ghana, http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/republic/supreme_court.php. 
 14. Dorothy Samuels, The Selling of the Judiciary: Campaign Cash ‘in the 
Courtroom’, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2008, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/15/opinion/15tues4.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
 15. Fordham Corporate Law Center, http://law.fordham.edu/corporatecenter.htm. 
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in the nation.16  We have an amazing business law faculty, full-time 
faculty, adjunct faculty – a group that I think is really unrivaled.  Among 
the full-time faculty members whom we have here tonight are Susan 
Block-Lieb17; Gus Katsoris18, from whom you will be hearing in a 
minute; Sean Griffith19; Richard Squire20; Linda Sugin21; Marcella 
Silverman22; Carl Felsenfeld23.  If my eyes were better, I would 
probably be able to pick out even more members of the faculty.  Thank 
you all for coming her
We have as our organizer the Fordham Corporate Law Center, 
which was established in 2001 under the leadership of John Peloso.24  
The current chair is Paul Soden.25  We have a brilliant Faculty Director, 
Professor Jill Fisch,26 with whom I’ve taught corporate law and theory, 
so I know personally how good she is.  She is our T.J. Maloney 
Professor of Business Law.  And we are joined by T.J. Maloney27 here 
tonight, in the front row. 
Jill is assisted by Professor Caroline Gentile28, who has done a great 
job in putting this together. 
The current Chair of our Corporate Center is Paul Soden, who is 
with us here in the front row. 
I want to make sure that you all know that we have our Journal of 
 16. Fordham Law School Facts, http://law.fordham.edu/facts/wom-fact3.ihtml. 
 17. Susan Block-Lieb – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml 
?id=507&bid=195. 
 18. See supra note 2. 
 19. Sean J. Griffith – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?id 
=507&bid=1183. 
 20. Richard Squire – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?id 
=507&bid=1176. 
 21. Linda Sugin – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?id 
=507&bid=123. 
 22. Marcella Silverman – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.iht 
ml?id=507&bid=135. 
 23. Carl Felsenfeld – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?id 
=507&bid=1146. 
 24. Corporate Law Center, supra note 15. 
 25. Paul Soden – Biography, http://www.thompsonhine.com/lawyer/PaulSoden/. 
 26. See supra note 3. 
 27. T.J. Maloney – Biography, http://center.spoke.com/info/p1NHOun/TMaloney. 
 28. Caroline Gentile – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml? 
id=507&bid=511. 
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Corporate and Financial Law29, which is really more and more 
influential.  We were cited by the Supreme Court in the Arthur Andersen 
case.30  We’ve got recent issues of the Journal outside. 
We are incredibly proud of this series.  In the eight years that we 
have had the DeStefano Lecture, we have [had] a series of brilliant 
lecturers and panels that have done so much to illuminate business law 
topics.31 
I’d like to acknowledge, representing Mr. DeStefano’s firm, Becker 
Ross32, Partner Howard Justvig33, of the Class of 1976, who is joined by 
his wife Flora and brother Gerard. 
Without further ado, I want to turn matters over to Professor Gus 
Katsoris, a legend, who will deliver formal remarks.  Then we will be 
hearing from the equally legendary Professor Jill Fisch. 
Gus? 
OPENING REMARKS 
PROF. KATSORIS:  Good evening ladies and gentlemen. 
On behalf of the DeStefano family, I would like to welcome you to 
the Eighth Annual DeStefano Lecture.  Unfortunately, the family could 
not be with us tonight, but send their regrets along with their warmest 
regards. 
These lectures are being sponsored by the firm of Becker Ross.  
The lecture series bearing Al’s name has had a most distinguished track 
record. 
I would like to reflect upon the Second DeStefano Lecture in the 
year 2002, when we explored the explosive topic “Enron: What Went 
Wrong?”34  I had the pleasure of chairing that panel, which included 
 29. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, http://law.fordham.edu/ 
jcfl.htm. 
 30. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (citing 
Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and 
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721 (2003)). 
 31. See Fordham Law Corporate Law Center, Highlights of Prior Programs, 
http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/priorprograms.html [hereinafter Highlights]. 
 32. Becker Ross, LLP is a law firm located in New York, N.Y.  See Becker Ross, 
LLP, Marhub NY 4532571 (LEXIS). 
 33. See Howard Justvig – Biography, Marhub NY 453257 (LEXIS). 
 34. Symposium: Albert A. DeStefano  Lecture on Corporate Sec. & Fin. Law, 
Panel Discussion, Enron: What Went Wrong?, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1 (2002) 
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Kurt Eichenwald35, author of Serpent on the Rock, and one of the 
leading financial writers of The New York Times; and Dan Dooley36, 
who is nationally recognized as one of the foremost forensic 
accountants.  The great abuses that led to the collapse of Enron and the 
unfortunate demise of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen were frankly 
and openly discussed that 
Shortly thereafter, the remedial legislation, called Sarbanes-Oxley, 
was enacted to impose greater accountability and transparency, thus 
helping to prevent future disasters like Enron.38 
However, if anyone thought that legislation alone would bring an 
end to economic meltdowns, they were sadly mistaken, for last summer 
we discovered there was a new virus in our midst, called subprime 
mortgages.39  Moreover, this virus was not contained to subprime 
mortgages, as it opened the floodgates to such issues as: bank 
liquidity,40 the infusion of capital from sovereign wealth funds,41 
restrictions on student loans,42 the contraction of consumer credit,43 the 
[hereinafter Enron Panel Discussion]. 
 35. Kurt Eichenwald – Biography, http://kellyaward.com/mk_award_popup/eichen 
wald_k.html#eichenwald_biography. 
 36. Daniel Dooley – Biography, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4048/is_ 
200201/ai_n9031956/pg_6. 
 37. See generally Enron Panel Discussion, supra note 34. 
 38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. Law. No. 107-204; 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 
Stat.) 745. 
 39. See, e.g., Elizabeth Laderman, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Capital 
Markets (Dec. 28, 2001) http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2001/el200 
1-38.pdf (defining “subprime mortgage” and “subprime lending”). 
 40. See Heidi N. Moore, How Bad Is It?: The Bank Liquidity Problem, WALL ST. 
J., July 17, 2008, at C3; Damian Paletta & Alistair MacDonald, Mortgage Fallout 
Exposes Holes in New Bank-Risk Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2008, at A1; Min Zeng, 
Governments’ Bonds Tumble, Reflecting Inflation Worries, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2008, 
at C4. 
 41. See Yuka Hayashi, Japan Hopes to Lure Sovereign Investors, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 8, 2008, at C2; Harsh Joshi, Reality May Thwart Plans for India Fund, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 10, 2008, at C8; David Hale, Brave New Economy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2008, 
at A14. 
 42. See Robert Tomsho, The Best Ways to Get Loans for College Now, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 13, 2008, at D1; Robert Tomsho, NorthStar Halts Student Loans, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 3, 2008, at B18. 
 43. See David Roche, The Credit Crunch Will Go On, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, 
at A25; David Roche, Recession Is Inevitable, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2008, at A19. 
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st to name a few. 
is greed. 
 
uncertainty of counter-party guarantees,44 potential downgrading of 
bond insurers,45 auction rate securities,46 naked short selling,47 and the 
elimination of the uptick rule,48 ju
Admittedly, the Enron debacle and the present problems are 
distinguishable.49  But there is a common denominator, and that 
common denominator 
Ironically, a few years ago, in 1999, with the removal of the barriers 
to bank diversification by the repeal of Glass-Steagall,50 we were led to 
believe that such diversification would lessen the overall exposure to 
risk.51  How wrong they were, as we have recently witnessed some of 
the major players involved in this subprime morass experiencing the 
collapse of their market value.52 
Before we discuss tonight’s topic, I would like to say a few words 
about the man after whom this lecture series was named, Al 
DeStefano.53 
Al stands for the best Fordham Law School has to offer.  He 
graduated first in his class, went on to become a partner in the Becker 
firm, specializing in corporate matters and mergers and acquisitions.  In 
his spare time, he devoted himself to numerous charitable endeavors.  
 44. See Krishna Guha et al., Analysis: Saviours of the Suburbs, FIN. TIMES 
(London, Eng.), June 4, 2008, at 9; Martin Feldstein, Liquidity Now!, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
12, 2007, at A19. 
 45. See James J. Eccleston, Escape From “Auction Rate Securities”, 154 CHI. 
DAILY L. BULL. No. 67 (Apr. 4, 2008). 
 46. Associated Press, Lawmakers See Progress In AuctionRate Securities, 
IHT.COM, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/18/business/NA-US-
Auction-Securities-Hearing.php. 
 47. SEC DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, KEY POINTS ABOUT REGULATION SHO (Apr. 
11, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm. 
 48. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, SEC Final Rule, Release No. 34-55970, 17 
C.F.R. 240 & 242, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/final/2007/34-55970fr.pdf. 
 49. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, A Lender Failed. Did Its Auditor?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2008, at BU1. 
 50. Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1933). 
 51. See Charlotte Bahin, Bank Business Diversification Gets a Big Boost, REG. 
REP., June 30, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 4349482. 
 52. See, e.g., Kevin G. Hall, ECONOMY: Treasury Reforms Little Help for Current 
Crisis, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 31, 2008, at A1. 
 53. Symposium: Inaugural Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate Sec. & Fin. 
Law, Forward, 6 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 269, 269-71 (2001). 
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As an adjunct member of our faculty, he shared his enormous 
knowledge and experience with our students.  Most importantly, Al was 
straight as an arrow.  What you saw was what you got. 
Through this lecture series we hope to remind ourselves of our 
mission: to produce skilled professionals of character, integrity, and 
compassion – people like Albert A. DeStefano. 
Events of the last decade have shown us the enormous breakdown 
in ethical and professional standards.  Greed has replaced compassion.  
Self-interest has replaced loyalty.  Enrichment has replaced righteous-
ness.  Deceit has replaced transparency. 
Many can share in the blame, starting with the mortgage brokers or 
loan reviewers, or the lenders and investment bankers who transferred 
subprime mortgages and securities and sold them throughout the 
world.54  Lawyers, regulators, and rating agencies were not much help, 
either.55 
Had the skilled professionals involved in packaging and selling 
these products been a little more concerned with their fiduciary 
obligations to the investing public, we might not be here today.  In the 
case of subprime mortgages and related products, what you saw was not 
necessarily what you got.56 
Tonight we are fortunate to have with us a panel of distinguished 
experts who will explore the causes of this virus and the effect it had on 
the various areas of our economy, and hopefully tell us whether we are 
in the third inning, the fifth inning, or the ninth inning of this fiasco; 
suggest some remedies to alleviate the problem; and, most importantly, 
to prevent it from recurring. 
At this point, it is my great pleasure to present Jill Fisch, who will 
present the panel.  Jill is the Director of our Corporate Law Center.  It 
gives me great pleasure to present to you one of our own, Jill Fisch. 
INTRODUCTION 
PROF. FISCH:  Thanks, Gus. 
I’m Jill Fisch. I’m the Director of the Fordham Corporate Law Cen-
ter.  I am here to add my words of welcome to those of my colleagues. 
 54. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007). 
 55. Id. at 2084. 
 56. Id. at 2070-73. 
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I am delighted to see you all here tonight.  I am delighted with our 
panel.  I will keep my remarks brief because I know you really want to 
hear from them. 
I want to thank our panel for being here.  I am going to introduce 
them to you in a minute. 
Of course, I want to thank the Becker Ross firm for establishing this 
lecture series.  As Dean Treanor has mentioned, it has been just a terrific 
series and we have had some really spectacular programs. 
I also want to acknowledge the Corporate Center’s Board of 
Advisors; our Corporate Practice Partners, several of whom are here 
tonight; and special thanks to Jeanne Rosendale57, who was instrumental 
in putting this program together.  We couldn’t have done it without her, 
so I want to give her a special word of thanks. 
I want to acknowledge the hard work of my colleagues, Professor 
Caroline Gentile58 and the Executive Director of the Center, Ann 
Rakoff59.  They really worked hard putting this program together and in 
encouraging all of you to be here. 
Just as a reminder, tonight’s lecture marks the Corporate Center’s 
second public lecture of this academic year.  In the fall, SEC 
Commissioner Paul Atkins60 delivered the A.A. Sommer Jr. Lecture.61  
This fall the Corporate Center also hosted its biannual academic 
conference, the Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy Conference on 
Corporate Law.62  This year’s conference, “Protecting Investors and the 
Securities Markets” (you will agree a timely topic) featured presentation 
and discussion of papers by leading academics, as well as a keynote 
address by Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine63. 
Finally, we had here at the Law School almost a dozen practitioners 
over the course of this academic year, many of them loyal Fordham 
 57. Jeanne Rosendale – Biography, http://www.portfolio.com/resources/executive-
profiles/Jeanne-Rosendale-JD-36274. 
 58. See supra note 28. 
 59. Ann Rakoff is the Executive Director of Fordham Corporate Law Center.  
Fordham Corporate Law Center, Contacts, http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/ 
contact.html. 
 60. Paul Atkins – Biography, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/atkins.htm. 
 61. Symposium, The Eighth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, 
Securities and Financial Law, 13 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 177 (2008). 
 62. See Highlights, supra note 31. 
 63. Leo Strine – Biography, http://courts.delaware.gov/courts/court%20of%20chan 
cery/?jud_off.htm#Strine. 
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alumni, to meet more informally with students in our Business Law 
Practitioners Series.64 
We are starting to plan next year’s events.  Just yesterday, I re-
ceived confirmation that Elisse Walter65, Senior Executive Vice 
President [of] Regulatory Policy and Programs at FINRA, has agreed to 
deliver next year’s Sommer Lecture.  That Lecture is scheduled for 
November 6, 2008.  Mark your calendars now.66  This is sure to be a 
great event. 
If you aren’t already on our mailing list and you want to be in-
formed of this and other upcoming programs, send us an e-mail or drop 
off a business card so we can be sure to keep you up-to-date. 
Tonight’s program, as you know, deals with the subprime lending 
crisis.  In planning this program, we were particularly interested in the 
broad effect that the crisis has had – and continues to have – on the 
financial markets.  We have debated everything, in our planning calls 
and in the hallways with our students, from the contributing factors to 
the crisis to the proposals that seemed to emerge almost on a daily basis 
for regulatory reform. 
Although business scandals and crises regularly erupt on the global 
financial landscape (Gus mentioned Enron, and I too was thinking of 
Enron; it’s still a recent enough memory that my students recognize the 
name when I talk about it in Corporations [class]), few events in recent 
history have had such an extensive impact on the economy and the 
global markets as the subprime crisis. 
To help us understand the crisis, let me turn to the panel.  I will 
introduce them in alphabetical order – and our panelists are conveniently 
arranged in alphabetical order so you can follow along with me.  All of 
our panelists’ qualifications and credentials are just too numerous to 
cover in detail, so I hope they will forgive me for a little editing. 
We start with Steven M. Cohen67, Counselor and Chief of Staff of 
the Office of the New York State Attorney General.  Mr. Cohen was a 
Partner in the Litigation Department of Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, 
 64. See Fordham Corporate Law Center, Calendar of Events, Spring 2008, 
http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/calendar.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
 65. Elisse Walter – Biography, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/2006/ewalter_ 
bio.pdf. 
 66. Registration and additional information for the event is available at http://law. 
fordham.edu/corporatecenter.htm. 
 67. See supra note 5. 
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where he specialized in white collar criminal defense and the trial of 
criminal and civil matters.  Prior to that, he served as an Assistant 
United States Attorney and as a staff attorney in the New York Regional 
Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  He is a graduate of 
New York University and received his law degree from the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School. 
Next in order, Harvey Miller68, Senior Partner [at] Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges LLP, where he created and developed the firm’s Business 
Finance & Restructuring Department which, as I understand it, 
specializes in reorganizing distressed business entities and represents 
creditors, investors, and purchasers of distressed businesses and assets.  
He previously served as Managing Director and Vice Chairman of 
Greenhill & Co., an international investment banking firm.  He is the 
author of numerous publications and the recipient of a host of awards for 
distinguished service and excellence; a graduate of Brooklyn College 
and Columbia Law School. 
Gretchen Morgenson69 is Assistant Business and Financial Editor 
and columnist at The New York Times.  She has covered the world’s 
financial markets for The Times since May 1998, and won the Pulitzer 
Prize in 2002 for her “trenchant and incisive” coverage of Wall Street.70  
Her articles are a frequent source of authority in legal academia.  I ran a 
LEXIS search yesterday and found that she has been cited in 342 
scholarly articles, which is quite impressive, on topics ranging from 
executive pay, stock options, bankruptcy, scandals on Wall Street, and a 
host of other topics.  Ms. Morgenson began her career at Vogue 
magazine, and after several years as a stockbroker (so she was down in 
the trenches there learning the inside story) returned to journalism, 
working for Money magazine, Forbes, and Worth magazine before 
joining The Times.  She has also written two books.  She is a graduate of 
St. Olaf College. 
Richard Neiman71 is the forty-third Superintendent of Banks for the 
New York State Banking Department.  Immediately prior to joining the 
Banking Department, Mr. Neiman served as President and Chief 
Executive Officer of TD Bank USA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of The 
Toronto-Dominion Bank.  Mr. Neiman began his career with the Office 
 68. See supra note 6. 
 69. See supra note 7. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See supra note 8. 
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of the Comptroller of Currency in Washington, D.C., serving as Special 
Assistant to the Chief Counsel.  He then spent ten years at Citicorp, 
holding a variety of legal and regulatory positions.  He returned to 
Washington, D.C., and served as the Director of Regulatory Advisory 
Services for PriceWaterhouse.  Mr. Neiman graduated from American 
University School of Government and received his law degree from 
Emory. 
Giovanni Prezioso72 is a Partner in the Washington, D.C. office of 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton.  I once worked there too, a very long 
time ago.  His practice is focused on securities and corporate law 
matters, and he has served as counsel to a variety of major financial 
institutions, public companies, and trade associations.  From 2002 until 
2006, he served as General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  Under his leadership, his office coordinated the imple-
mentation of the enforcement and regulatory provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, so he knows a good deal about regulatory reform and how to 
make it work.  Mr. Prezioso currently serves as the Chair of the 
Executive Council of the Federal Bar Association Securities Law Com-
mittee.  He is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School. 
Muriel “Mickie” Siebert73 is the Founder, Chairwoman, and CEO 
of Muriel Siebert & Co., Inc.  Ms. Siebert has been called “the first 
woman of finance” – the first woman to own a seat on the New York 
Stock Exchange, the first to head a New York Stock Exchange member 
firm, and the first woman Superintendent of Banking for the State of 
New York.  Ms. Siebert is involved with a wide range of nonprofit, 
civic, and women’s organizations.  Although she didn’t finish college, 
Ms. Siebert holds eighteen honorary doctorate degrees, more than any of 
us academics.  Her autobiography, Changing the Rules – Adventures of 
a Wall Street Maverick74, was published in 2002
Last but not least, our moderator this evening is Stuart Kaswell75, a 
Partner in the Financial Services Group at Dechert LLP and head of the 
firm’s Broker-Dealer, Financial Institutions, and Market Regulatory 
Practice.76  Prior to joining Dechert, Mr.Kaswell was Senior Vice 
 72. See supra note 9. 
 73. See supra note 10. 
 74. MURIEL SIEBERT & AIMEE LEE BALL, CHANGING THE RULES: ADVENTURES OF A 
WALL STREET MAVERICK (Free Press ed., 2007) (2002). 
 75. See supra note 4. 
 76. At the time of this Lecture, Mr. Kaswell was a Partner in the Financial Services 
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President and General Counsel for what was then called the Securities 
Industry Association, now known as SIFMA.  He served as Securities 
Counsel to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and as a 
branch chief in the Division of Market Regulation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  Mr. Kaswell has written widely on securities-
related matters.  He is profiled in Who’s Who in America77 and was re-
cently listed in the peer-reviewed “Washington, D.C., Super Lawyers.”78  
He graduated from Vassar College and received his law degree from the 
Washington College of Law of the American University. 
So as you can see, we have a wide range of experience, expertise, 
and background.  On behalf of the Fordham Corporate Law Center, I 
welcome you.  I’m delighted that you are here. 
I now turn over the floor to Stuart Kaswell. 
PANEL DISCUSSION 
MR. KASWELL:  Thank you on behalf of all the panelists.  Thank 
you for that glowing introduction.  Considering the previous group here, 
these are big shoes to fill, but I’m confident the panelists I am privileged 
to sit next to will meet that challenge. 
Tonight we will try to divide this topic up into three pieces.  We are 
going to address them not necessarily in equal time, but rather will try to 
divide it up so that we have manageable things to talk about. 
First, how did we get here?  How did the subprime problem start 
and extend around the world?  If you had told me a year or so ago that 
this would spread all around the world and we would have situations like 
Northern Rock in the United Kingdom79 as part of the subprime crisis, I 
would have been incredulous.  I guess I still am. 
The second part will be:  Where are we now?  What’s the current 
situation?  Or, as Professor Katsoris said, what inning are we in?  I see 
the Fed sort of acting like a specialist used to on the New York Stock 
Group at Dechert LLP.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Kaswell joined Bryan Cave LLP.  See 
supra note 4. 
 77. MARQUIS, WHO’S WHO IN AMERICA 2007 (A.N. Marquis Who’s Who ed. 2006) 
(1899). 
 78. Super Lawyers, Stuart Kaswell, http://www.superlawyers.com/washington-dc/ 
lawyer/Stuart-J-Kaswell/1dd0eedd-627b-4d20-9d19-543d18cfb1b5.html (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2008). 
 79. Eric Pfanner, Future Uncertain for Northern Rock, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 
17, 2007, at 13. 
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Exchange, providing liquidity in circumstances that we haven’t seen in 
some time.80 
Third, and what I think we should spend the most time on, is: 
Where do we go from here?  What should be the remedies that we look 
for?  What are the right answers going forward?  Do people have the 
right incentives to do the right things in the future? 
There are lots of different topics that we can bring into this conver-
sation, and I hope we will. 
My goal, too, is to make this a conversation, not like so many of the 
legal conferences where each person gets a couple of minutes, talks 
about a case or two, and then we move on.  I want this to be a much 
more interactive panel.  I will try to encourage everybody to chip in, so 
if I haven’t heard from you I will probably call on you.  I guess they’re 
used to doing that in law schools. 
With that, I would start with:  How did we get here?  Why do you 
think we’re in this fix?  How did the problem start?  How did we find 
ourselves in such a fix? 
MR. MILLER:  I think, as Gus said, we have established in the last 
few years two basic drives of humanity: greed and sex.  I don’t know if 
the order is correct, but certainly that’s it. 
MR. KASWELL:  Am I in the right room?  [Laughter] 
MR. MILLER:  How did we get here?  Because (1) there is no insti-
tutional memory. The discussion about Enron and the frauds that 
occurred there was quickly forgotten.81  And (2) we moved into an econ-
omy where greed became good.  Gecko82 was a prophet of what was 
going to happen.  If you live in an economy where credit becomes freely 
available (and we live in a very credit-induced society), you are going to 
keep expanding that credit base until the cycle is going to end.  The 
bubble is going to burst at some point in time. 
We live in a laissez-faire economy. I don’t want to point any fingers 
at Mr. Greenspan, but regulatory oversight disappeared and exuberance 
took over.83  I think he used the expression “excessive exuberance.”84 
 80. See David Leonhardt, Can’t Grasp Credit Crisis? Join the Club, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 2008, at A1; Robin Sidel et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street:  Inside the 
Demise of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1. 
 81. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 38 (discussing the collapse of Enron and 
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 82. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 83. See Jon Hilsenrath, Markets Police Themselves Poorly, But Regulation Has Its 
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We started with this concept that every single American is entitled 
to own a home.85  Whether you can afford it or not, you are entitled to 
own a home.  If you ever saw that play Glengarry Glen Ross86, the 
people who were selling aluminum siding went into selling mortgages. 
When you looked at the setup of what was happening, a mortgage 
originator got a huge commission on originating a mortgage.87  The 
mortgage originator just sold those mortgages to a bank in a warehouse 
loan until there were enough of those mortgages put together so you 
could do a securitization.88  So the originator really didn’t care whether 
the mortgagor could ever afford to service the mortgage.89  He got his 
commission or she got her commission right up front.90  You put it into 
the warehouse loan, and as soon as you had enough of these securities, 
you did a securitization. 
What we have done is we have sped up the complexity of the 
Flaws, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2008, at A2; Greg Ip, His Legacy Tarnished, Greenspan 
Goes on Defensive, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2008, at A1. 
 84. Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Annual 
Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996) (stating, “But how do we know when irrational 
exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected 
and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?”); see also 
Justin Lahart, Bernanke’s Bubble Laboratory, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2008, at A1. 
 85. George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Remarks at the 
National Federation of Independent Businesses at the J.W. Marriott Hotel (June 17, 
2004) (“We want people owning their own business, we want people owning their own 
homes . . . if you own something, you have a vital stake in the future of our country.  
The more ownership there is in America, the more vitality there is in America, and the 
more people have a vital stake in the future of this country.”); see also Jackie Calmes, 
Bush Aides Strive for a Domestic Agenda, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004, at A4. 
 86. DAVID MAMET, GLENGARRY GLEN ROSS (Grove Press 1984). 
 87. See Arthur Levitt Jr., Regulatory Underkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2008, at 
A13; Gretchen Morgenson & Geraldine Fabrikant, Countrywide’s Chief Salesman and 
Defender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, § 3, at 1; Liam Pleven & Susanne Craig, Deal 
Fees Under Fire Amid Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 88. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2060-61 (discussing recent 
developments prompting investment banks, loan aggregators, and investors to intensify 
due diligence on subprime residential mortgage-backed securities). 
 89. See id. at 2043 (“Predatory lending is a syndrome of loan abuses. . . . A major 
example is asset-based lending, which consists of loans to borrowers whom the lender 
knows cannot afford the monthly payments.”). 
 90. See id. at 2080 (discussing unfair advantage of lenders in subprime loans). 
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market so that you can’t really tell what is in there.91  And people 
stopped doing risk analysis.92  There was a company in California where 
for $55 they would confirm that you were an independent contractor.93  
For another $25, they would answer telephone inquiries.94  So all you 
had to do was fill out your mortgage application, pay the $55, and a 
salesman would help you fill out the mortgage application. 
Everybody just forgot about risk analysis.  You had a matrix.  The 
theory was that if you [put] enough mortgages into the securitization, 
you were spreading the risk.95 
Then, when they started taking that same rating and creating out of 
the securitization collateral debt obligations (CDOs)96, you had tranches 
from AAA down to B.97 What you bought depended on the risk 
involved.  I don’t know who determined that risk except by a matrix.  
Then you took the bottom tranche, the Bs, put them into a CDO, and 
suddenly the Bs became AAAs.98  Now, I don’t know how you do that.  
 91. See id. at 2049 (describing that there is an information asymmetry–mortgage 
lenders have more information than investors as to the risk associated with these 
securities.). 
 92. See id. at 2040, 2049 (discussing turning a blind eye to securitization and risk 
analysis of subprime loans). 
 93. See Julie Creswell, Web Help for Getting Mortgage the Criminal Way, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 16, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/technology/ 
16fraud.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&fta=y. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2056-57 (discussing how diversification 
of the loan pool in terms of geography, credit risk, prepayment risk, and legal risk can 
protect investors from loss). 
 96. See generally Standard & Poor’s, Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO 
Criteria, Mar. 21, 2002, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixed 
income/cdo_criteria2002_FINALTOC.pdf (providing an introduction to Collateralized 
Debt Obligations). 
 97. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2047. 
The tranches are arrayed from the most senior to the most junior, with ‘as many as 
five mezzanine or subordinated tranches going down the ratings ladder’ from AAA to 
B.  The senior class is the AAA tranche, the mezzanine class consists of the AA and A 
tranches, and the BBB, BB, B, and unrated classes take the junior position.  Any 
rating of BBB-/Baa3 or above is deemed investment-grade and serves to assuage 
investors’ concerns about the credit quality of the mortgages backing the securities. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Moody’s Investor  Services, Moody’s Rating 
Symbols and Definitions, Aug. 2003, available at http://www.rbcpa.com/Moody’s_ 
ratings_and_definitions.pdf (explaining Moody’s nine symbols [Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, 
B, Caa, Ca, C] used to designate least credit risk to greatest credit risk). 
 98. This refers to CDOs-Squared, a certain aspect of securitization.  See, e.g., 
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GDP
 so much more than I could possibly ask 
for, 
uity 
prices would continue to increase.102  That never happens in history. 
In medieval times, that was an alchemist who took a stone and said, 
“I’m creating gold.” 
I can remember being on a panel at the end of June 2007 that was 
made up of two [representatives of] hedge funds, myself, and a senior 
vice president from Moody’s.  The two hedge fund [representatives] 
said:  “There’s a ‘Perfect Storm’ forming.  We can see this because the 
prices that are being paid are so out of whack with the values con-
cerned.”99  The gentleman from Moody’s said: “Oh no.  This is a con-
tained situation.  It will never expand beyond 4.6 percent of the 
.”100 
But everybody was investing in this.101  I had a client who heard 
about how easy it was to borrow money.  He wanted to do a project.  We 
went to Morgan Stanley and we made a loan application.  We went up 
there.  We got into this conference room.  The bankers came in and they 
said, “Here’s a proposed term sheet.”  My client read the term sheet.  
Suddenly I saw he got all red.  He said, “Excuse me.  I have to go to the 
men’s room.”  I was worried about what happened.  I followed him into 
the men’s room and I said, “Bud, what happened?”  He said, “I looked at 
the term sheet, and they gave us
I didn’t know what to do.” 
That was the environment that you were in.  Everybody thought this 
real estate boom (if you want to call it that), [and] the home eq
 
Nomura Fixed Income Research, CDOs-Squared Demystified (Feb. 4, 2005), http:// 
d, July 12, 2006, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?article 
etary 
2, at 2045 (stating that today, lenders securitize 
 10, 
e.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm 
[he
 subprime ARM lending was based: 
www.securitization.net/pdf/Nomura/CDO-Squared_4Feb05.pdf. 
 99. See Knowledge@Wharton, Commercial Real Estate’s Perfect Storm: What 
Lies Ahea
id=1517. 
 100. See, e.g., Mark Whitehouse & Sarah Lueck, Subprime Fears Spread, Sending 
Dow Down 1.97%, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A1 (quoting Treasury Secr
Henry Paulson who states that the subprime mortgage crisis is largely contained). 
 101. Engel & McCoy, supra note 4
almost 80% of subprime mortgages). 
 102. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Women in Housing & Finance Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon (Jan.
2008), http://www.federalreserv
reinafter Bernanke Speech]. 
Although poor underwriting, and, in some cases, fraud and abusive practices 
contributed to the high rates of delinquency that we are now seeing in the subprime 
ARM market, the more fundamental reason for the sharp deterioration in credit 
quality was the flawed premise on which much
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When it started to fall apart, nobody was aware that all over the 
world people were investing in these derivatives.103  Once that started to 
happen, you could not contain it anymore.  So the subprime crisis has 
now leaked into other areas.104 
As we get more conservative, it begins to be almost like 
cannibalizing because the banks start to pull back.105  Ms. Morgenson 
wrote an article on Sunday about home equity loans disappearing.106  I 
paid a lot of money to get a home equity loan.  I never drew on it be-
cause I didn’t need the money.  Now I get a notice from my bank that I 
can’t draw on it.  I don’t know if [the bank] can do that legally, but [it is] 
trying to do it. 
You have an environment now where, if you look at the bottom of 
the feeding chain – the consumer – the consumer’s discretionary income 
is contracting.107  And if you look at it, the consumer today is paying 
more than 30 percent of his discretionary income for necessities, which 
means that [he] [is] not using [his] discretionary income to buy other 
things.108 It’s fuel and it’s food. [In addition], the University of 
that house prices would continue to rise rapidly. 
Id. 
 103. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk:  Global Implications of the Securitization of 
U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 86 (2008) (stating that the business of 
securitizing mortgages has a huge global demand and a seemingly endless supply). 
 104. Bernanke Speech, supra note 102 (“[T]he losses in the subprime mortgage 
market also triggered a substantial reaction in other financial markets.”). 
 105. Id. (“We also see considerable evidence that banks have become more 
restrictive in their lending to firms and households.”). 
 106. See Gretchen Morgenson, You Thought You Had an Equity Line, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2008, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/business/ 
13gret.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
 107. Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Univ. of North Carolina at Wilmington, Cameron School of Business’ 
Business Week Program (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/kohn20080226a.htm. 
At the same time, continued sizable increases in the prices of food, energy, and other 
commodities have raised inflation. To some extent, those increases have resulted from 
strong demand in rapidly growing emerging-market economies, like China and India. 
But the increases likely also reflect conditions such as adverse weather in some parts 
of the world, the use of agricultural commodities to produce energy, and geopolitical 
developments that threaten supplies in some petroleum-producing centers. The higher 
prices have eroded the purchasing power of household income, adding to restraint on 
spending. 
Id. 
 108. Aaron Smith, Retailers Struggle as Stimulus Money Dries Up, CNNMONEY, 
2008 DESTEFANO LECTURE:   19 
 SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 
 
ly 
gone
 banks – correct me if I’m wrong, Gretchen – 
$250
eps going up.  That’s what I under-
stand
ped.  
And
s agree?  Do others feel that this is a 
good
 
Michigan just came out with a report that estimates that 5,800 retail 
stores will disappear this year because consumer confidence is basical
.109 
The whole concept in June and July that we could contain this crisis 
has really disappeared.110  We still have a situation where major finan-
cial institutions are undercapitalized.111  The projection was that the sub-
prime crisis would cost the
 billion in charges.112 
MS. MORGENSON:  It just ke
.  Now it’s a trillion dollars.113 
MR. MILLER:  Okay.  The other day in the Financial Times it was 
a trillion dollars.114  But U.S. banks will be $250-280 billion.115  They 
haven’t taken all those charges yet.  Wachovia announced that they have 
to raise another $7 billion of capital.116  So we have a situation where 
our financial institutions are under-capitalized, the credit has stop
 then you think back:  Where were the rating agencies in all this?117 
MR. KASWELL:  Do other
 diagnosis of where we are? 
MR. COHEN:  I probably have the distinction of being the least-
Aug. 7, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/07/news/companies/same_store_sales/ 
index.htm (discussing the effects on retailers as consumers must spend more of their 
discretionary income on necessities). 
 109. Richard Curtin, March 2008 Update on Home Prices, Reuters/Univ. of Mich. 
Surveys of Consumers (Mar. 2008), http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/documents.php?c=r. 
 110. See, e.g., HSBC Sees Progress in Subprime Recovery, WALL ST. J., May 23, 
2007, at A10. 
 111. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Study Finds Wider Impact of Mortgage Losses, WALL. ST. J., 
Mar. 1, 2008, at A2 (revealing that many highly leveraged institutions hold capital that 
only amounts to 4 to 10 percent of their total assets). 
 112. Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Banks Fear a Deepening of 
Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 113. See, e.g., Interview by Gillian Tett with George Magnus, Senior Econ. Advisor, 
UBS (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf507b7e-e16c-11dc-a302-0000779fd 
2ac.html?nclick_check=1. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 113. 
 116. David Enrich & Dennis K. Berman, Wachovia to Receive Big Infusion of 
Capital, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2008, at C1. 
 117. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2060-61, 2068-69 (explaining that due 
diligence is both the job of rating agencies and something that would help manage risk, 
yet it is often conducted by rating agencies in a cursory manner since their interest in 
the investment is not so high and is limited to legal compliance). 
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east-credentialed person on the panel.  The 
anal
of t
a kid – I grew up in the Midwest – there was a little 
town ing to 
hold
 is.  And Harvey’s money is in Gretchen’s home.”  That model 
ceas
 providers began selling mortgages.  They had an 
inter
) you understand where this is going to lead you, which is to 
a sit
 
sophisticated person and l
ysis is perfectly right. 
When you take a step back and look at it, from my perspective, 
which is as a prosecutor [and] you try to understand what happened, 
there is a simple analysis:  it used to be that people sold homes.  At some 
point, the industry changed and what really was happening was the busi-
ness became selling mortgages, not selling homes.  Once it was the sale 
he mortgage that began driving the market, things began to 
change.118 
I remember as 
 bank where my parents banked.  You knew that bank was go
 the mortgage. 
MR. KASWELL:  Was Jimmy Stewart the guy?  [Laughter] 
MR. COHEN:  There is an interesting issue as to where Bedford 
Falls, [the mythic town in It’s A Wonderful Life], was actually located.  
But it’s exactly right.  The Jimmy Stewart bank was the Bedford 
Building and Loan.  There’s that great scene where there’s the run on the 
bank (I’ll keep it brief, but it’s worth seeing It’s a Wonderful Life119) and 
the Jimmy Stewart character explains, “Your money isn’t with me.  It’s 
not here behind the counter.  It’s in Harvey’s home.  That’s where your 
money
ed to exist.  I don’t know when it ceased to exist, but at some point 
it did. 
The very structure of what most lay people understood to be the 
foundations of a mortgage system changed.  So the risk moved away 
from the people who [and institutions that] were providing the mortga-
ges.120  The mortgage
est in selling as many mortgages as possible.121  They didn’t have to 
worry about the risk. 
That is the simple analysis of how this whole thing began.  If you 
think about it from that perspective, that paradigm (and it’s easy to do 
after the fact
uation in which there is no real foundation for the value of those 
mortgages. 
 118. Id. at 2045 (outlining the advent and expansion of subprime securitization into 
a $525.7 billion industry by 2005). 
 119. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films (II) 1946). 
 120. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2041. 
 121. See id. at 2043-44. 
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 to encourage people to buy their first house, and we were 
goin oney [for a down 
paym
of ev
econd what Harvey said, which is that everyone 
alon
interest rate increase like these loans were creating) – those kinds of 
 
MR. KASWELL:  When I first learned about this, I thought it was a 
good thing
g to help them, because they didn’t have enough m
ent]. 
MR. MILLER:  If they can service the mortgage. 
MR. KASWELL:  I understand. 
MR. MILLER:  If you’re going to do financing at 120 percent of 
value, then I think you have a problem. 
MS. MORGENSON:  These homes were sold, I think, on the basis 
er-rising home prices.122  That is a very important part of the analy-
sis.  That has stopped, as we all know. 
I would certainly s
g the way in each step of this process basically had an interest in 
looking the other way. 
First of all, you had the loan originator or the mortgage broker.  
They got paid more in commission for the riskier loans that they would 
make.123  So if you were going to do an FHA loan, which is an old 
standby government-ensured-to-a-degree loan for a fixed mortgage for a 
thirty-year period,124 you got paid far less than if you did a two-year 
ARM125 that would adjust after two years to a skyrocketing interest rate 
that virtually no one could withstand, and with a hard prepay penalty126, 
which means that you cannot prepay, you can’t get out of it somehow.  
Those kinds of loans, which were toxic loans to most people127 (I don’t 
care if you’re low-income or high-income; nobody can withstand a huge 
 122. Patrick McGeehan, Home Prices Start to Dip, Recalling ‘90s Slump, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2008, at A23. 
 123. Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 11, 2006, at 
70. 
 124. See id. 
 125. An ARM is an adjustable rate mortgage.  See id. 
 126. See id. (“[B]orrowers who jumped into so-called option ARM loans have 
another, more urgent problem:  payments that are about to skyrocket.”). 
 127. See id. 
With its temptingly low minimum payments, the option ARM brought a whole new 
group of buyers into the housing market, extending the boom longer than it could 
have otherwise lasted, especially in the hottest markets.  Suddenly, almost anyone 
could afford a home – or so they thought.  The option ARM’s low payments are only 
temporary.  And the less a borrower chooses to pay now, the more is tacked onto the 
balance. 
Id. 
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 important 
expl
131  Innovation at the center of this is really the securiti-
zatio
 where to focus 
your
h that process to 
global investors seeking higher yield around the world. 
When we talk about rating agencies not being able to keep track of 
issues – How do you value those instruments?  How do regulators asses 
the risk?  [What about] risk managers within those institutions?  [What 
about] compliance and regulators globally?  It really is a case where 
loans paid more.  Wall Street paid more for those loans to put them into 
the securitization pools.128  The mortgage brokers received more to write 
the loans.129  Every step of the way, people were paid to look the other 
way, including the rating agencies.130  I think that is a very
anation, or at least part of the puzzle of why we got here. 
MR. NEIMAN:  I like to characterize it as [a situation] where risk 
controls and best practices and regulatory supervision did not keep pace 
with innovation.
n process. 
When you think back on the S&L crisis, one of the things about the 
S&L crisis is you did know where the risk lay.  It lay in the institutions 
that were making those commercial development loans.  The develop-
ment of the securitization process really was a dispersal of risk.132  If 
you had asked anybody back then, “Is that a good thing?” of course it 
has benefits.133  Part of the challenges that we are seeing now is that you 
don’t know where all the risk lies, so you don’t know
 attention and where the risks are in the system.134 
The other thing the securitization process provided was an oppor-
tunity for global investors seeking higher yield.  It provided a great 
opportunity for mortgage loan originators to go out and create with these 
misaligned incentives products that could be sold throug
 
 128. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2060. 
tional Law-Making for the Financial Markets, 
el & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2056-57. 
 borrowers, or adequately address the ‘full range of risk factors in the 
market’). 
 129. See Der Hovanesian, supra note 123. 
 130. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2055-56, 2068. 
 131. Caroline Bradley, Private Interna
29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127, 128 (2005). 
 132. See Eng
 133. See id. 
 134. See, e.g., Holly Sraeel, Analytics of The Future? A Question Not Easily 
Answered, BANK TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.americanbanker.com/ 
printthis.html?id=20080828N5GYOMHS&btn=true (discussing the fact that the 
industry became overly reliant on credit-risk-scoring models that did not give a 360-
degree view of
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inno
re.  While greed probably played a part in all of this, to the 
exte
ely. 
f human beings. I think it’s 
som
 crisis ultimately.137 
n would 
say s
 
vation was well ahead of supervision.135 
MR. KASWELL: Giovanni and Mickie, do you have some thoughts 
here too? 
MR. PREZIOSO:  I think my view is probably closer to Richard’s 
than to some of the others. 
I think it is important here to step back and think about incentives 
and structu
nt people broke laws, which is a distinct issue from greed, we ought 
to be punishing those people aggressiv
As much as I admire being part of the tail-end of the Baby Boom 
generation (and we like to believe we exceeded everyone who came 
before us in every way), I don’t actually think we are setting new all-
time records for greed in this generation o
ething that has been around for a while. 
And even the process of securitization is not something new.136  In 
my misspent youth as an associate at Cleary Gottlieb in the 1980s, I did 
a lot of securitization of mortgages. We didn’t invent securitization three 
or four years ago.  This is not a new thing. 
The old world of thrifts, as Richard has pointed out, had its own 
imperfections that really were what led, not only to a lot of expensive 
mortgages for people and unavailability of mortgage money in key times 
when people needed it, but also to the S&L
So I think it is important to step back.  A lot of you probably have 
had a similar kind of experience.  I happened to go to grade school with 
nuns.  Whenever you got in trouble with the nuns, if you said, “I didn’t 
do it,” after the nun is whacking your hand with the ruler, the nu
omething like, “It doesn’t matter.  I’m sure you did something else 
just as bad.”  That was true, it was always true, but it didn’t create 
 135. See Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of Fr.,  Speech at the Int’l Monetary 
Fund – Bank of France – Bank of England Conference: Challenges of Financial Inno-
vation for the Conduct of Monetary Policy (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.bis.org/ 
review/r080212a.pdf; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2050-51; Der 
Hovanesian, supra note 123. 
 136. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2045; Kyle Richard & Melissa Kosiba, 
Securitization:  A Platform to Debate Accounting, THE CPA J., Oct. 2005, available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/1005/perspectives/p10.htm (“The securitiza-
tion market began in the early 1970s with the issuance of bonds backed by mortgage 
loans.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, 
S64-66 (1991). 
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al 
or se
this 
a year ago, but [also] 
Chai
uldn’t spill over into the general 
econ
 
mark
incentives to good conduct and it didn’t change the way you behaved. 
I think it is awfully important here to try to be very realistic about 
what is different as opposed to the things that are with us always. 
In thinking about that, what captured some of this for me was a 
report that the IMF did that just came out last week.  They do an annu
mi-annual Global Stability Report.138  They talked in this report – 
and they were criticizing their own report of a year ago when they said 
– about a collective failure to appreciate and anticipate the breadth 
of what was happening in the mortgage market.139 
There are two parts to that I would emphasize: (1) the collective 
element, and (2) the breadth element. 
The collective element is pretty astounding, when you look back.  
Not only the IMF when it was writing this report 
rman Bernanke as late as June was giving testimony saying that the 
risk was confined, looked like it wo
omy.140  If you look at the rating agencies, they weren’t seeing this. 
If you look at the investment banks – this is something that is allu-
ded to in the IMF report – it wasn’t that they weren’t doing risk analysis.  
[Rather], it’s that when they were doing the risk analysis on terms that 
the IMF refers to as “even assuming unprecedented deterioration of the
et,” they weren’t coming up with these numbers, these kinds of 
losses.141 
 
 138. See Int’l Monetary Fund, World Econ. & Fin’l Surveys, GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
ernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
cial markets have remained supportive of economic growth.  
Id.
. See GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 138, at xv-xvi. 
STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL 
SOUNDNESS, Apr. 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf 
[hereinafter GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT]. 
 139. See id. at ix. 
 140. See Ben S. B
Sys., Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress Before the H. Comm. on 
Fin’l Services (July 18, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/ 
bernanke20070718a.htm. 
For the most part, finan
However, conditions in the subprime mortgage sector have deteriorated significantly, 
reflecting mounting delinquency rates on adjustable-rate loans.  In recent weeks, we 
have also seen increased concerns among investors about credit risk on some other 
types of financial instruments.  Credit spreads on lower-quality corporate debt have 
widened somewhat, and terms for some leveraged business loans have tightened.  
Even after their recent rise, however, credit spreads remain near the low end of their 
historical ranges, and financing activity in the bond and business loan markets has 
remained fairly brisk. 
 
 141
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y bearish position.  They bet that the market was going to go 
dow
to be problems 
in su
ear flood you may do things that are actually 
wors
m – depend on 
peop
 about potential risk.  
We 
n trying to reduce risk 
than
transparency and illiquidity in this market as we go forward. 
You have read about these stories of an investment bank that took a 
very big loss in the fall as part of what was in fact a bearish bet.  They 
took a ver
n.  They still ended up losing a lot of money, because the way they 
set up their hedges was structured, [based on their belief that the market] 
was going to go down.  They thought it was going to go down a lot, but 
they just didn’t think it was going to go down this much. 
I think it is interesting to focus on that second element.  It’s not that 
people didn’t see that there were going to be problems in subprime.  
There were a lot of people who thought there were going 
bprime.142  What nobody saw, [however], was how bad they were 
going to be. 
It’s the difference between the ten-year flood and the hundred-year 
flood.  The way you prepare for those is very different.  Sometimes in 
preparing for the ten-y
e for you when you get to the hundred-year flood. 
So I think that focusing a little bit on how it is that so many 
institutions in so many different positions – admittedly, many with con-
flicts of interest, which compromise our whole syste
le having self-interest driving them and regulators having a broader 
picture.  No one saw this.  Why didn’t they see it? 
I’m focusing a little bit on the question of transparency in the 
marketplace, because what we really count on in our markets is 
signaling from the marketplace about losses, [and]
all watched the central planning model in the Soviet Union and a lot 
of other countries.143  Trying to assemble all the data about risk is a use-
ful thing to do, and indeed I think as we look forward, when we get to 
that later, we can talk a little about how that would play out in our 
federal system, getting that information together. 
But I also think it is worth talking about how it is that the market – 
with so many people who I believe were no more or less greedy, no 
more or less intelligent, no more or less focused o
 any of our ancestors in other eras of financial ups and downs – got 
it wrong, and what that says about the [significance of the] lack of 
 
 142. See Steven Pearlstein, Subprime Meltdown: Analysis, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 18, 
2007, at D1. 
 143. See Stanislaw Wellisz & Ronald Findlay, Central Planning and the “Second 
Economy” in Soviet-Type Systems, 96 ECON.  J. 646, 646 (1986). 
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the old-line 
store
companies.  You could see that all over the 
coun
 that I had been asked to go into by Enron was a totally 
diffe e-country, off-balance-
shee
e of the builders made people sign a paper that they 
coul
ulators?  Where were the account-
ants?
 
MR. KASWELL:  Mickie, what do you think?  Is there nothing 
new under the sun here? 
MS. SIEBERT:  I think, first of all, [that] all you had to do was to 
go out to the country.  If you went to Southampton, a lot of 
s were replaced by real estate companies.  They were either selling 
or they were mortgage 
try. 
I think the money was too vast and too fast. 
I looked at some of this because I had been asked to testify in 
Enron,144 which I did when Enron was going on.  I was totally shocked.  
The loan
rent kind of loan, but it involved out-of-th
t items.  I called it “total moral bankruptcy” to the Senate, because it 
needed the permission and the blessings of the lawyers, the accountants, 
the Wall Street firms, and the Wall Street banks.145  Without any of 
those four the Enron loan that I had been asked to look at would not 
have been in existence. 
I looked at the individuals who were speculating in Florida, in 
Miami.  They would buy apartments they had no intention of living in.  
They were buying them and they were flipping them.  It was so preva-
lent that som
dn’t sell it for a year.  But it was there, and it was obvious.  And 
these people were getting mortgages. 
I just cannot see why some of the people didn’t speak up.  When I 
read about one of our banks bringing the subprime back on to their 
balance sheet, back into the country, and they needed X billions of 
dollars to do this – where were the reg
  We have to ask these questions. 
 144. See Muriel Siebert, Chairman and CEO of Siebert Financial Corp., Testimony 
Before the U.S. S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations (Dec. 11, 2002), http:// 
hsgac.senate.gov/121102siebert.htm. 
 145. See Protecting the Investor, DOLLARS & SENSE NEWSLETTER, (Muriel Siebert & 
Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2002, available at http://www.siebertnet.com/forms/ 
body_newsletter.asp?Idx=26 
Enron, in my opinion, represents a total moral bankruptcy. It took more than the 
officers and the directors of the company. It required the participation of accountants, 
lawyers, and investment and commercial banks. As we all know, the investing public 
and employees paid dearly, many of whom will never be able to recoup their losses. It 
is imperative that this does not happen again. 
Id. 
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ppened.  I called some people I 
hadn
t wasn’t a matter of people just buying a larger 
hom
n’t apply across the board, and so the system failed.  
In ot
1929 collapse and the 
Dep
I wasn’t smart enough to see the depth of it because it’s not my 
business.  I was shocked as I saw the growth of it and I saw the way it 
was so totally prevalent. 
I did some checking when this ha
’t talked to in years.  They told me about the way mortgage appli-
cations were totally falsified.146  They would create an application and 
create an income.147  So i
e than they could afford.  It also got into lack of knowledge of some 
of the people who were buying homes.  I heard of one couple in Cleve-
land.  (I’m from Cleveland originally). I did a little checking.  They were 
going to buy a house for $150,000.  A working couple.  Good history of 
work.  The mortgage broker said, “With rates this low, you can buy a 
house for $250,000.”  So they bought a house for $250,000 and they’re 
now being foreclosed.  Where were our ethics?  They seem to have been 
on a long vacation. 
MR. KASWELL:  What we hear in different points of view is 
sometimes the incentives were there and people forgot their morals.  
Other times people had incentives perhaps only for one part of the 
transaction but it did
her cases, it may just have been abuses and people doing the wrong 
thing.  As Giovanni said, that’s another problem. 
MR. MILLER:  But when you say “doing the wrong thing,” I don’t 
think you can excuse things by saying “greed has always been here, and 
therefore it’s not any different than any other situation.”  I think greed 
probably preceded the 1929 collapse.  But the 
ression resulted in some corrective legislation.  We moved into a 
world of laissez-faire.  If you are going to say laissez-faire, greed is 
going to come to the forefront. 
If you take the Carlisle Capital Fund, which goes public in 
Amsterdam, and a $29 billion fund that leverages up thirty-three times148 
– this is an overwhelming thing. 
 
 146. See Kenneth R. Harney, New Report: Housing Boom Stimulating Mortgage 
Application Fraud Boom, REALTYTIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/ 
l, Carlyle Raises First Fund Since Debacle, HEDGEWORLD 
008, 2008 WLNR 6531518. 
20050801_applicationfraud.htm (“What sort of games are people playing with 
mortgage applications? You name it – everything from little white lies about income or 
assets all the way up to what the FBI calls ‘air loans’ that are based on completely 
fabricated information.”). 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Emma Trinca
NEWS, Apr. 7, 2
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ne of the things we all agreed we would do is 
talk 
are now.  We 
are i
S. MORGENSON: I was talking with one of my sources yester-
day 
“Okay, what inning are we in?” That’s the metaphor every-
one 
ept it’s a double-header.”  [Laughter] 
 gotten to a point where we 
can t shoe to drop, we get another big 
huge  recapitalized or 
that 
 
I don’t want to get into politics, but we had a national policy in 
favor of laissez-faire.149  Greed is a great driver, as I said, and people are 
going to take more risks. 
And where did the hedge funds fit into all of this?  Where did the 
private equity funds fit into all of this?  That added to it.150 
MR. KASWELL:  O
about the issues, as you’ve done, Harvey, but not talk about the 
politics, which is fine.  I think that works us into where we 
n this situation, which I don’t think anybody anticipated.  I think 
we’ve got ourselves in this situation now where [many] people are in 
terrible shape personally.  You read about the stories of the foreclosures 
rates.151  The stories even [show that] people’s pets are being abandoned 
in homes.  The human element of this is really very tragic.  And again, 
some people got into it for all the wrong reasons.  Some people were just 
naïve. 
But where are we now?  What do people think?  Gretchen, what do 
you think? 
M
who is a very high-level executive in fixed income at a major firm. 
I said, 
wants to use. 
He said, “We’re in the seventh inning.” 
I said, “Oh, great, that’s great.” 
He said, “Exc
Every time we seem to think that we’ve
start to feel maybe that’s the las
 announcement from a firm or bank that needs to be
needs to raise capital, that coughs up some massive loss or other, or 
has to bring something back onto their balance sheet.152 
I truly want to be bullish.  I am tired.  I have been writing about this 
 149. See SHERRYL DAVIS KASPER, THE REVIVAL OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN AMERICAN 
MACROECONOMIC THEORY: A CASE STUDY OF THE PIONEERS 2 (2002). 
ds-in-subprime-
1. 
 2008, at C1. 
 150. See Research Recap, Role of Hedge Funds in Subprime Crisis Examined, 
http://www.researchrecap.com/index.php/2007/12/21/role-of-hedge-fun
crisis-examined/. 
 151. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Builders and Homeowners Under Strain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 2008, at C
 152. See, e.g., Eric Dash, Surprise Loss at Wachovia Stirs Profit-Season Unease, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
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 entire financial 
syste
he Fed has pushed have helped that 
and 
 on the economy.  
[But
portionately impacted.  Concentrated areas within Brooklyn and Queens 
 
for more than a year now.  I would love to move on to something else.  
But I really feel like the way this has leached into the
m means that it is going to be with us for quite a while, I think, 
throughout this year and into 2009. 
One of the reasons is that a lot of the exotic mortgages that were 
created in the midst of the boom have not yet even reset to high 
levels.153  Now, the low rates that t
[have] helped to ameliorate that situation.154  But I think we have a 
whole raft of loans that were made where people did not have to pay 
down any principal.  These were negative-amortization loans.155  They 
only would have to start paying the principal down when the loan 
became 125 percent of the value of the property.156  That whole group of 
loans I think is still out there, possibly waiting to be a problem that hits 
the system.  So I would have to agree with my Wall Street source. 
MR. NEIMAN:  There is a lot of focus on the impact on the 
financial institutions and the continued write-downs and the pullback on 
credit and how that is going to put downward pressure
] you can’t lose sight of the impact on communities.  As a state 
regulator, it is clear [to me].  In New York it’s interesting because New 
York as a state certainly hasn’t been impacted as much as the nation.  
New York’s foreclosure filings are up 10 percent 2007 over 2006.157  
The nation is up 75 percent.158  States like Ohio, California, and Nevada 
are up over 200 percent.159 
But having said that, [some] areas of New York are being dispro-
 153. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Vikas Bajaj, The Tricky Task of Offering 
Aid to Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at A1. 
mpanies . . . [are] positioned to 
/blog/?p=19 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
m/ContentManagement/ 
 154. See, e.g., Norm Alster, Some Banks (Yes, Banks) May Be Back in Favor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at BU5 (“[S]ome financial co
benefit from the flurry of recent Federal Reserve moves to cut interest rates and restore 
market liquidity. . . . [Also], some regional banks are now poised to benefit from 
plunging short-term rates.”). 
 155. See generally Kenneth R. Harney, Should Risks Beget Rules?, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 8, 2006, at F01. 
 156. Home Mortgage Loans, Inc., Negative Amortization Loans, http://www.home 
mortgageloansinc.com
 157. See RealtyTrac Staff, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007, 
RealtyTrac, Inc. Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.realtytrac.co
pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=3988&accnt=64847. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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 Those are areas – particularly Long Island, 
whe
 losing 
her h
, but they don’t know [precisely how much] they are 
wort
e are missing is [that] this has 
leach
titutions to close, and suddenly the financial institution or 
 
account for almost 40 percent of those foreclosure filings, Suffolk and 
Nassau over 20 percent.160 
re escalating home prices really drove people with a very high-
pressure sales force, and provided opportunities for people to purchase 
homes, particularly using products like these Option ARMs, where the 
majority of those individuals [were] paying minimum payments. 
We are doing a lot of outreach into communities, trying to bring 
borrowers together with lenders.161  One woman I met with recently was 
facing the loss of her home, a single mother with four children.  She said 
the most disturbing thing that upsets her is not the fact that she is
ome, but [rather] the fact that there are four or five other people on 
her very block that are ashamed and embarrassed to come seek help 
because they really feel that they put themselves into this position.  So I 
think the impact on communities, even in New York, should not be 
underestimated. 
MR. KASWELL:  You see at the institutional level [that] debt mar-
kets in some cases have just frozen up.162  Different institutions have 
securities in their portfolio that they can’t price.  They know they’re 
worth something
h.  You see lenders trying to borrow money.  There are lenders and 
borrowers out there, but the transactions just don’t seem to be working.  
The markets seem to have seized.  It is a very difficult situation for 
people who are in business right now. 
Harvey, I don’t think you are going to see that situation where your 
client gets offered more money than he could ever dream of again for 
some time. 
MR. MILLER:  I think what w
ed over into the commercial area.163  The drop in liquidity is affec-
ting commercial transactions; transactions have commitments from 
financial ins
 160. See N.Y.S. Banking Dep’t, New York State Foreclosure Filings by County of 
 Family Homes:  First Quarter 2008, http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr 
, http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr080210.htm. 
ompany Collapses, N.Y. 
One-to-Four
080529.pdf. 
 161. See N.Y.S. Banking Dep’t, Senate Democrats, NYS Banking Department and 
Financial Institutions Join Forces to Help New York Borrowers Protect Their Homes, 
Feb. 10, 2008
 162. See, e.g., Leonhardt, supra note 80. 
 163. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Dealbook Extra, Radio Static, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
28, 2008, at C6; Charles Duhigg, Deal to Buy Mortgage C
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at C3. 
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the s
  On one hand, if you are a real pessimist, you could say 
we’r
 fact that] a lot of people did 
not 
ual market prices, they have to make 
predictions about the future at precisely a time when they have the least 
market information available to them to make those predictions.168  That 
yndicate says, “Oh no, we’re not ready to close.”  You see that in 
[situations like when] Finish Line and Genesco were supposed to merge 
[and abandoned the deal].164 
You see it happening in Chapter 11 cases, where suddenly the exit 
financier says, “I’m not financing.” Think of Delphi Corporation.165 
Solutia for a long while wasn’t able to get exit financing.166  There’s this 
retrenchment. 
Many of the institutions are scared to death that if somebody starts 
liquidating these securities, they are all going to have to mark-to-
market.167  If they have to mark-to-market, what is it going to do to their 
balance sheets?
e on the edge of a “Perfect Storm.”  Then, if you want to say it’s the 
seventh inning and it is only a single game, everything is going to work 
out.  [On the other hand], I think there is a real problem about it working 
out.  I think the liquidity crisis is very serious for the commercial world.  
And it has leached right through subprime. 
MR. KASWELL:  Just because I’m physically removed from the 
folks at the other end, please chime in. 
MR. PREZIOSO:  I would just add to the point you were making 
about the seizing up and spilling over – [the
forecast this means that a lot of people don’t have confidence in 
what the future is going to bring. 
There are a couple of interesting ways in which there has been a 
negative feedback loop that people have commented on here.  To the 
extent the markets have seized up and institutions have had to mark to 
model instead of marking to act
 
 164. See Reuters, Footwear Retailers End Plans to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
ick Bunkley, Delphi Drops Finance Plan but Expects Another Soon, N.Y. 
ankruptcy Exit Hits a Snag, 
he Banks Are Just Counting Wrong, WALL ST. J., 
Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2008, at 
2008, at C4. 
 165. See N
TIMES, July 10, 2007, at C8; John D. Stoll & Kathy Shwiff, GM to Tap Rest of $4.5 
Billion Credit Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008, at A2, available at http://www. 
collegejournal.com/article/SB122186953006359023.html. 
 166. See Jeffrey McCracken & John D. Stoll, Delphi’s B
WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at C1. 
 167. See John Berlau, Maybe t
Sept. 20, 2008, at A15; Arthur Levitt Jr. & Lynn Turner, How to Restore Trust in Wall 
Street, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A17. 
 168. See Ethan Penner, Of Markets and 
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is a c
ent in 
Janu
the 
scru
r market.169  Everyone believes their home should only 
go u
hallenge not only to those institutions, but also to regulators. 
It creates a dynamic where, if you project losses higher than ever 
before (let’s say suddenly going to 10 percent loss assumptions) you 
write down a lot of assets.  Those announcements come out.  People 
think the situation is going to get worse.  The projections go down even 
further.  So people who were projecting cumulative losses of 10 percent 
in October, in terms of the rating agencies, were at 19 perc
ary, I think.  So everybody writes down their assets even more. 
The more this goes on, you also begin to see – and this is an 
inevitable and unfortunately cyclically-enhancing part of the regulatory 
system – that when times are good, regulators are hard-pressed to actual-
ly get people to tighten up capital and lending standards, which is 
precisely when they should be [doing so], of course.  When times are 
bad (like right now) you have everyone very acutely aware of 
tiny they are under, in terms of every extension of credit they make.  
As they go through that exercise, [people] become more sensitive to the 
way regulators are going to look at what they are doing.  [At the same 
time], regulators are very sensitive to being criticized for not adequately 
overseeing folks. 
I think there is an element that grows out of the lack of ability to see 
prices in real-time – that is not just at the financial institution level or the 
instruments themselves, but rather at the level of the real estate market 
itself, which is one of the less liquid markets out there, and one in which 
we all know home sellers don’t like to (as they say in the stock market) 
capitulate to a bea
p in value.170 
I think that is an element that makes it quite difficult to know when 
 
A23; Susan Pulliam et al., U.S. Investors Face an Age of Murky Pricing, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 12, 2007, at A1. 
 169. See Mark Gongloff, Ahead of the Tape, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2008, at C1; 
Michael M. Grynbaum, Jittery Markets Make the Most of Good News, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 2008, at A1; James R. Hagerty, U.S. News:  Home Sales Rise in Hard-Hit 
Areas, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at A3. 
e
 believe th me increased over the previous year.  
 TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, Part C, at 1. 
 170. See Sushil Cheema, Owners Think Home Values Hav  Risen, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 7, 2008, at D6. 
[According to a] second-quarter survey . . . 62% of the 1,361 homeowners who 
responded said they e value of their ho
But . . . that high level of optimism is out of sync with reality.  [D]ata show[s] that 
77% of U.S. homes depreciated in value over the past year, while only 19% 
appreciated. 
Id.; Peter Y. Hong, Should You Buy Now?, L.A.
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; all those factors, if the market started to turn, would 
tend
hings to succeed.171  But I am no prognosticator of the future.  In 
term
uld 
have
t, plus a lot of small 
bank
I think that we are going to have to look at some of these earnings 
that are coming out.  We are going to have to see whether these loans 
y 
co l 
ins
-
this is going to end
 by the same token to reinforce pretty quickly a positive feedback 
loop. 
I think the regulators are making a clear effort to show that they 
want t
s of where we are now, I just think not very many people know. 
MS. SIEBERT:  I think that we have to look towards the account-
ants.  I’m sorry that this panel is not in two weeks, because we wo
 had all the earnings out by the major banks.  The auditors are not 
going to allow banks just to tell them, “Oh, don’t worry about this.”  
They are forcing them to bring the assets back.  They are forcing them to 
mark them to market to the best of their ability.172 
We had Wachovia out yesterday.173  In the next week we are going 
to have a half-a-dozen of other major banks ou
s.  Then we’ll get an idea.  No auditor is going to bend over back-
wards when they can become the next Arthur Andersen. 
were brought back to the country or are they still sitting somewhere.  I 
believe that the accountants will have a tendency to be extremel
nservative.  We will have information on the rest of a lot of financia
titutions within a couple weeks. 
MR. KASWELL:  One of the things I remember from the Sarbanes
 
 171. See Greg Hitt, Damian Paletta, & Deborah Solomon, Bailout Negotiations in 
Disarray, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1; see also Karen Richardson & Damian 
Paletta, Spitzer Warns Bond Insurers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2008, at A1. 
 172. See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become 
Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at A1. 
 173. See Eric Dash, Wachovia Is Said To Raise Billions Amid Rising Credit Losses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, at A16. 
The Wachovia Corporation, the country’s fourth largest bank, is raising several billion 
dollars from outside investors because of mounting housing losses and an ill-timed 
acquisition of a big California mortgage lender, people briefed on the matter said 
Sunday night. 
 
It is unclear whether the investment will come from the issuing of new shares of stock 
to the public or from private investors. Wachovia said Sunday night that it would 
move up the release of its first-quarter earnings to Monday from Friday, without 
explanation. That has led to speculation that an announcement of an investment deal 
could come with its earnings report. 
Id.; David Enrich & Dennis K. Berman, Wachovia to Receive Big Infusion of Capital, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2008, at C1. 
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ies that failed,” 
and 
re in that spectrum right now, but I 
prett
note has not been assigned properly.175  
Thes
Oxley experience was – and I can’t remember the sequence anymore – 
this feeling of “well, there were a couple of big compan
then it seemed like it was one after the other.  If it hadn’t been that 
sort of succession of problems, I don’t think in Washington we would be 
talking about Sarbanes-Oxley today.  It just seems like [everyone is 
asking], “Is there any end in sight?”  I think that is what crystallized the 
political consensus in Washington to say, “Yes, it’s time to pass some-
thing.”  I am not sure where we a
y clearly remember that. 
MS. MORGENSON:  I think that part of the problem that we are 
having with a resolution is just from the standpoint of the free market; 
i.e., vulture funds, people who have an interest in distressed properties, 
should be starting to tiptoe into some of these markets.  But I think that 
one of the reasons we are not seeing more of that is the complexity of 
the securitization pools, which create difficulty in even finding out who 
owns which part of the note.174  Now you are starting to see bankruptcy 
judges actually stopping lenders from foreclosing because they don’t 
prove standing because the 
e are all sort of boring little details that get sloughed off during a 
boom, and certainly did in this case. 
This is now making it extremely complicated to extricate good 
loans from bad in these pools so that people can step in and say, “Look, 
I’ll buy that piece and this piece and the other piece.”  The securitiza-
tion, I think, contributed to the problem on the up-side and now it is 
contributing to the problem on the down-side as well.176 
MR. MILLER: And it’s more complex because in 2005 the 
Bankruptcy Code was amended so that bankruptcy judges don’t have 
any discretion anymore to stop repo securitizations from creditors fore-
 
 174. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2045-48. 
59, 2008 WL 3870820 (hold-
ee John H. Makin, Recession 2008?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2007, at A13. 
 175. See, e.g., In re Hayes, No. 07-13967, 393 B.R. 2
ing that the entity moving for relief from a stay as to mortgage property as trustee of a 
corporate entity other than that named as mortgagee in original mortgage documents 
failed to satisfy its burden of tracing mortgage from this original mortgagee to separate 
entity for which it was allegedly acting as trustee, and did not have standing, as party in 
interest, to pursue stay relief) (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19, 22 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (holding that the party moving for relief from a stay to exercise 
its purported rights in mortgaged property did not have requisite standing where, at time 
the motion was filed, it had not yet obtained assignment from the original mortgage 
lender). 
 176. S
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closi
d [runs].  And 
then
yet the big bumper-sticker law enforcement cases.  
We 
to get your arms around, in part because, to the extent 
there
ng and taking their collateral.177  So you have a much diminished 
Bankruptcy Court. 
If you look at American Home Mortgage178 and similar pending 
cases, the secured lender goes in and says, “You have no authority to 
stop me from foreclosing,” and [takes its] collateral an
 you don’t know who the counter-party is.  You really don’t know in 
half the cases. 
MR. COHEN:  The other thing that has happened here is that 
because of the complexity, unlike in past versions of these kinds of 
crises, there aren’t 
don’t have an Enron.  Oftentimes, when you get those big cases, 
rightly or wrongly (you can argue that you get a skewed perception from 
looking at the worst examples) they do tend to sharpen the issues. 
From a prosecutor’s standpoint, these are very difficult cases to 
wade into and 
 was misconduct (and we can argue over whether or not a lot of this 
was driven by misconduct), it was a very broad, almost institutional, 
industry-wide accepted type of [mis]conduct.179  To the extent that these 
were broad practices, they ended up being very complex, involving all 
sorts of phases of transactions.180  So you don’t even have what is akin 
to the autopsy that is placed out there for everybody to look at. 
MR. MILLER:  Wait, Steve.  Wait for Countrywide.181 
MR. COHEN:  I think Countrywide will be the first big one.  From 
 
 177. See S. Todd Brown, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 569, 586, n. 61 (2007) (citing multiple 
articles discussing how the 2005 amendments to the B nkruptcy Code limited judicial a
discretion); Karen Gross et al., 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 497, 502-03 (2006) (discussing the 
de too many high-cost home loans to borrowers who 
at 
C1.
 18
 18 eks to 
tors’ abuses of homeowners). 
2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code). 
 178. See Peg Brickley, American Home Creditors to Review Payment Plan, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 20, 2008, at B3D. 
 179. See, e.g., Mark Maremont, FDIC Faces Mortgage Mess After Running Failed 
Bank, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2008, at A1. 
Federal officials heap much of the blame for the subprime mortgage mess on lenders, 
claiming they recklessly ma
couldn’t afford them.  It turns out that the U.S. government itself was one of the 
lenders giving out high-interest, subprime mortgages, some of them predatory. . . . 
Id.; Ruth Simon, Investors Press Lenders on Bad Loans, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, 
 
0. See Maremont, supra note 179. 
1. See Peg Brickley & Donna Kardos, Credit Crunch:  Countrywide Se
Block Abuse Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2008, at A14 (commenting on lawsuits for 
credi
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appened to 
Arth ave thought 
that 
 report in New Century183 
abou
  That gets back to your earlier point, which is:  how 
muc
plest thing to understand is the liar loan. You [Ms. 
Mor
an application to find out that, in fact, 
the a
’t do it.” 
“Well, everybody else is doing it.  Folks at Firm B are doing it.” 
So you call up your friend at Firm B and say, “Are you doing X?” 
y?  W
a law enforcement perspective, these are cases that have been harder to 
get traction on than some of the earlier ones. 
MR. MILLER:  But I think after Enron and after what h
ur Andersen182, and talking about auditors, you would h
the accounting profession, the auditors in particular, would have 
been very careful. 
If you read the preliminary examiner’s
t some of the things that KPMG did, you ask, “Is this Enron all over 
again?  Was KPMG more concerned about its fees than actually doing 
an audit?”184 
MR. COHEN:
h of this is driven by greed?  How many of these fixes that they are 
going to look at and say, “Oh well, we can impose these solutions,” 
really were available years ago? 
The sim
genson] wrote a great piece on this a while ago, about how easy it 
would have been to spot.185  You can say, “Well, the person shouldn’t 
have lied on the loan application.”  Well, how hard would it have been 
to do the due diligence on that lo
pplication was bogus?  Those things didn’t happen. 
MR. MILLER:  Did anybody want to find out? 
MR. COHEN:  That’s exactly right.  They didn’t want to know. 
MR. KASWELL:  One of my stories I tell young associates is 
Client A calls up – let’s say it’s a broker-dealer – and says, “We want to 
do X in the market.  Everybody else is doing it but we can
I say, “You can’t do that.” 
He says, “What, are you craz e can’t do that.” 
Unfortunately, that sounds like it didn’t go on in this setting.  
 
 182. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
 183. See Peg Brickley & Amir Efrati, Credit Crisis:  KPMG Aided New Century 
Missteps, Report Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at A6; Schroeder v. New Century 
Holdings, Inc., 387 B.R. 95 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008). 
 184. See Press Release, U. S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Three Former 
KPMG Auditors for Altering Audit Working Papers (Mar. 30, 2006),  http://www.sec. 
gov/news/press/2006-45.htm (revealing that KPMG senior managers failed to complete 
audit). 
 185. Gretchen Morgenson, Crisis Looms in Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, 
at News Analysis 01. 
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Peop ey 
wan
f you 
get a d about all of these problems from his 
pers
dent in helping 
com
g in aviation stocks) and made money.  So if the govern-
men
ains in this country, where the 
gove ake some money on it when the time 
com
is: What’s the right thing to do in this situation?  I’m not sure 
le maybe didn’t care what Firm B was doing.  They did what th
ted to do. 
MR. MILLER:  I must tell you, Paul Volcker186 made a speech last 
week, on April 8, in which he talked about all these problems.187  I
 chance, read it.  He talke
pective.  It’s really quite a speech. 
MR. KASWELL:  Mickie? 
MS. SIEBERT:  The government did have a prece
panies.  The government guaranteed Chrysler and made money on 
it.188  The government guaranteed Lockheed189 (I was involved in that; I 
was specializin
t can guarantee something, why can’t we create a way that the 
government will make money on this so it won’t be a gift?  We don’t 
want to make it a gift.  We can’t afford to make it a gift.  But why can’t 
we create something, with all the br
rnment can guarantee and m
es? 
MR. KASWELL:  This is a convenient segue to the last part of the 
discussion, which is:  Where do we go from here?  There are all these 
competing proposals in Washington now, with the Administration and 
the House and the Senate having different views.190  Everybody has 
something to say about whether or not this package is better than that 
package: does it go far enough?  Does it go too far?  Are we rewarding 
people for behavior that we shouldn’t reward them for? 
I think there is certainly a political imperative to do something.  The 
question 
 
 186. Paul A Volcker – Biography, http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/Pvolckerbio. 
html. 
 187. See Paul Volcker, Former Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the 
er_April_2008.pdf. 
 
. 
m?campaign_id=yhoo. 
Economic Club of New York (Apr. 8, 2008), http://econclubny.org/files/Transcript 
_Volck
 188. See Allan Sloan, On the Brink of DISASTER, 157(7) FORTUNE 78 (Apr. 14, 
2008) (“[T]he government made $311 million from stock-purchase warrants it extracted 
for issuing the guarantee.”).
 189. See John Cobbs, When Companies Get Too Big to Fail, BUS. WEEK, INDUS. 
ED., Jan. 27, 1975, at 16 (noting the government’s bailout of Lockheed Aircraft with a 
$250 million loan guarantee)
 190. See Jane Sasseen, A Grand Old Problem for the GOP, BUS. WEEK, Mar. 24, 
2008, In Depth Section, at 46, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/ 
content/08_12/b4076046793012.ht
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rtainly, I would 
say r
ld be number one on my wish list.  
I jus  
rules
e and how much 
you are allowed to charge for certain fees in the mortgage.191  Those 
kind
 not crying for him) but I don’t 
think
ke him to try to explain 
that 
lk about regulators – I am in a law 
scho
 
that we can ever pass a law that will always prevent failure from 
occurring, as Gus said a while back. 
But what are the right steps to [take] and what are the wrong steps? 
MS. MORGENSON:  That’s a lot of territory.  Ce
egulators who regulate would be on my wish list. 
[Laughter] 
MR. KASWELL:  That would be a start in your judgment? 
MS. MORGENSON:  That wou
t feel like the regulators didn’t really have an appetite.  There were
 they could have enforced that they did not, things as simple as 
HUD rules on violations of what you put on a mortgag
s of violations were never pursued. 
Could we have regulators who have an appetite for regulating?  I 
don’t know how you make that happen.  But it just was such a failure 
this time around.  To me that would be job one. 
I [also] think disclosure has to be improved.  I’m not sure that Stan 
O’Neal192 understands what a CDO193 is.  I think that he got bounced (he 
took a lot of money with him,194 so I’m
 he understood what a collateralized debt obligation that was 
crammed with subprime mortgages was and how that was going to 
impact his company’s balance sheet.  I would li
to me.  I don’t think he could. 
So how about having people who really ask the tough questions and 
push back on these things when you’re making money hand over fist?  
Who’s in the boardrooms saying, “What about that?  Gee, that’s a huge 
increase in your derivatives book this year.  Is that putting the firm at 
risk at all?”  There didn’t seem to be any appetite for that either. 
MR. NEIMAN:  When we ta
ol, so I can use the term federal preemption195 – states like New 
 191. See 24 C.F.R. § 203.27 (1971) (listing the charges, fees, or discounts a mortga-
gee may collect from a mortgagor). 
 192. Stan O’Neal was formerly the CEO of Merrill Lynch. 
 Nov. 10, 2007, at B14 
ee Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 27 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007) 
ct to federal preemption). 
 193. See Standard & Poor’s, Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria, supra 
note 96. 
 194. See Rob Cox, Prince and the Pauper, WALL ST. J.,
(noting Stan O’Neal’s $160 million severance package). 
 195. S
(holding that under the National Bank Act, a national bank’s mortgage business whether 
conducted by the national bank or its subsidiaries is subje
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lending 
prac
g or 
othe
preemption to keep the states out of various issues.  If you think about 
York did take strong actions, both in the Attorney General’s Office and 
in the Banking Department, starting in 1999 with large actions against 
Household196 and Delta Funding197, highlighting and bringing 
significant actions against subprime lenders for predatory 
tices.198 
What was needed was an additional effort at the federal level.  
Instead of welcoming that and pursuing it both in terms of national 
banks – not only to the extent that they originate, but also to the extent 
that they are participating in the securitization process – the response 
was: “Sorry, you cannot even investigate these types of unfair lendin
r violations of national banks.  In fact, we are going to expand our 
interpretations of federal preemption and prohibit you from bringing 
actions or investigating or supervising subsidiaries of national banks.”199 
The federal regulators spent more time and effort thwarting the 
efforts of the states back in 1999, 2000, and 2001, which could have 
certainly made a difference.200  We’ve got to get beyond these federal 
regulatory turf wars and really look at how to recognize where state and 
federal regulators have to work together. 
MR. COHEN:  Let me pick up on that.  That is one of the more 
curious points.  You know the Chinese curse, “May you live in interest-
ing times.”201  Federalism has been turned on its head, in a way.  You 
have a federal government that is intent on enforcing its rights under 
 
 196. See Michael Cooper, Spitzer Inquiries Net The State $786 Million, A Record 
Sum, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004, at B2 (discussing Household Finance’s $37 million 
 Long Island Mortgage Company 
ry 
orted Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1308 
tes regulating 
ussing the meaning and origin of the phrase). 
settlement under accusations of predatory lending). 
 197. See Press Release, Office of N. Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer 
Announces Landmark $6 Million Settlement With
(June 23, 1999), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/1999/jun/jun23a_99.html. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predato
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supp
(2006) (discussing recent developments in the federal preemption of state predatory 
lending laws as well as the validity of regulatory attempts at preemption). 
 200. See id. at 1307 (“Recently, the federal government is thwarting efforts of state 
legislators to protect homeowners in their states by preempting state statu
predatory lending abuses.  Regulations preempt state predatory lending statutes appli-
cable to national banks and savings associations . . . and proposed legislation would 
preempt the statutes altogether.”). 
 201. See The Phrase Finder, May You Live In Interesting Times, http://www.phrases. 
org.uk/meanings/245000.html (disc
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st when I was in law school) 
pree
ption issue.  We knew litigating that issue, at least in the 
Seco
exceptions – were trying to do what they thought was best in light of the 
traditional notions of preemption (at lea
mption was always [invoked] so that the feds could dominate the 
field.  Now we find – and this happens in real cases – that when there is 
a state effort to issue an investigatory subpoena to a banking entity . . . 
[the state] can’t even do that because it falls within the scope of federal 
jurisdiction.202  The bank will come in and litigate, with the assistance of 
the feds, [to seek] to keep the state regulators or state investigators out of 
the area.203 
We had a curious [situation] in the AG’s Office not too long ago.  
We brought a lawsuit.  Everybody thought it was against Washington 
Mutual.  It wasn’t.  It was against two appraisal companies that were 
doing business with Washington Mutual.  At the middle of the case was 
basically an empty spot where WAMU would normally have sat because 
of the preem
nd Circuit, would have been a fool’s errand because the Second 
Circuit has already spoken to this.204  But if you don’t have the feds 
willing to take the initiative, and instead [using preemption to] more or 
less keep[] other potential regulators out of the field, these are the kinds 
of issues you are going to run into. 
MR. PREZIOSO:  I think that the federalism point is awfully 
important.  Maybe I just have too benign a view of the world, but I 
actually think all the regulators, more or less – and there are some 
way they saw their jobs. 
 
 202. See, e.g., Clearing House Ass’n, LLC v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).  In this case, the plaintiff, Clearing House Association, sued the 
Attorney General of the State of New York to enjoin him from instituting enforcement 
actions or investigating plaintiff’s national bank members and their subsidiaries relating 
to their residential mortgage lending practices.  At issue was whether the threatened 
Fair Housing Act (FHA) action was prohibited by § 484(a) of the National Bank Act’s, 
12 U.S.C.S. § 484(a), limitation on states’ visitorial authority.  In granting the plaintiff’s 
motion for an injunction, the court held that an action brought in the state’s parens 
patriae capacity to enforce the FHA’s fair lending provisions against plaintiff’s national 
bank members or their operating subsidiaries constituted a form of visitorial authority 
prohibited by § 484(a) of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 484, and was not 
authorized by federal law.  Therefore, the New York State Attorney General was 
enjoined from instituting any judicial action premised on the state’s parens patriae 
authority to enforce the FHA’s fair lending provisions against plaintiff’s national bank 
members or their operating subsidiaries.  Id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 321 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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 at the federal level, and a division 
betw
tter integration.  At the federal level, what the 
fede
ave been needed to 
reall
nately, given our 
polit
 derivatives have changed the entire industry.205  
We 
 
But I think one of the things we face, if you think about where we 
are now in terms of accountability, is a system that has grown up with a 
history at the state level, a history
een regulation of banks and thrifts and broker-dealers and so forth.  
It isn’t very well suited to the kind of marketplace that we have today, 
the kinds of international institutions that we have. 
I think it is important to strengthen all of the regulators and to think 
about ways to create a be
ral [government] can do best is pull together information from a lot 
of different sources.  When I was talking earlier about how people didn’t 
foresee this, that includes at the federal level.  I think there aren’t so 
many regulators, even at the federal level today, that have the kind of 
access across the board to banking institutions, securities firms, insur-
ance companies, mortgage brokers, that would h
y understand what was going on here.  I think to some extent we 
don’t even have that information together today.  So I think trying to 
figure out how to strengthen that is awfully important. 
By the same token, I think that the point about the state regulators is 
very well taken.  There is absolutely no reason that the system ought to 
be one in which states aren’t encouraged, obviously within the confines 
of a broader national and international economy, to be quite active in 
pursuing the kinds of interests that have always made state regulation so 
useful.  Sometimes it is called a laboratory.  There are all kinds of good 
ways to characterize it. 
I think that debate is maybe starting now.  Unfortu
ical cycle – and I am not trying to make a partisan comment – we 
happen to be in an election year.  It is going to be quite difficult for 
people to implement broad, far-reaching changes until after we have our 
election, at least.  That is a shame for all of us, because I think we are 
losing time that we don’t necessarily want to lose. 
MS. SIEBERT:  We all know that the products have become much 
more complicated.  The
are obviously going to have new regulation.  I think we should have 
regulation by function.  There is no reason that the same regulator can’t 
do the savings banks and the S&Ls and the commercial banks and the 
foreign banks if they are in that business.  Otherwise it doesn’t work.  
There are too many different regulators and there is too much dupli-
 205. See Unterman, supra note 103, at 132. 
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on fairly directly and says that the problem with functional 
regu
 
cation. 
MR. KASWELL:  If you look at the Treasury blueprint206 that came 
out, I agree; I don’t think there is any likelihood that that is going to 
become law before the end of this Congress.  [But] I think if you view it 
as the beginning of a process and a discussion, it is a very interesting 
document, whether you agree with it or not.  It does take on functional 
regulati
lation as we now have it – and I have always been a fan of it – was 
that it doesn’t allow a more comprehensive view of a particular insti-
tution, because you have different regulators looking at the bank or the 
broker-dealer or the insurance, which would be at the state level.207  I’m 
not sure that is entirely accurate, but I think it is fair to ask: Is this really 
the right model that we have had? 
We have a model that has grown up in many instances more as a 
response to a crisis; the 1929 crash, as Harvey mentioned before, created 
all the New Deal legislation.208  And we are now competing not just 
nationally, but [also] internationally.  The Treasury has looked at the 
Australian model of the Twin Peaks209 regulator, and the U.K. model of 
the FSA.210 
This is something where intelligent people can and should disagree 
as to what the right prescription is.  But I don’t think that anyone would 
invent the system that we’ve got now.  It is an accident of history rather 
than of logic. 
MR. MILLER:  I think it is fair to say that the market has outpaced 
 206. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGU-
t http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
ht, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and 
cies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great 
gration of Financial 
LATORY STRUCTURE (Mar. 2008), available a
reports/Blueprint.pdf. 
 207. Id. at 4. 
 208. See Fred Wrig
Foreclosure Poli
Depression, 57 ALA. L. REV. 231, 242 (2005) (discussing New Deal legislation enacted 
in responses to real estate conditions after the Great Depression). 
 209. Jeremy Cooper, Deputy Chairman, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n, Paper 
Presented to the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n of Braz.:  The Inte
Regulatory Authorities – The Australian Experience (Sept. 4-5. 2005), http://www.asic. 
gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/integration-financial-regulatory-authorities. 
pdf/$file/integration-financial-regulatory-authorities.pdf (discussing the Australian 
“Twin Peaks” model). 
 210. See Financial Services Authority, http://www.fsa.gov.uk (last visited Oct. 18, 
2008). 
2008 DESTEFANO LECTURE:   43 
 SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 
 
s.  The complexity of the market, the derivatives and all of 
these
 to the debt, and nobody knows who the counter-parties 
are.2
notional – would be to increase margin requirements.213  Now, 
nobo
 
Inter
the regulator
 other sophisticated securities . . . .  [T]hink of the CDO market.  
You have $45 trillion of notional value which only deals with $5.9 
trillion of debt.211  So somebody is trading in these derivatives that has 
no attachment
12 
I think there is a real issue as to whether the regulators can ever get 
up to speed on this.  You have a market which is basically opaque.  I 
don’t really know how any government is going to face up to that issue. 
MS. MORGENSON:  I think one way to deal with the credit default 
swap market – which is what I think you’re talking about with the $45 
trillion 
dy ever wants to do that, including Alan Greenspan, who back in 
the Internet bubble was asked at an Economic Club of New York dinner, 
“Why don’t you raise margin requirements?”214  This was in 1999, when
net stocks only went up and individuals were flocking to the stock 
market.  He said he didn’t believe in it, that raising margin requirements 
didn’t work.215  Well then why . . . is it in your arsenal of potential fixes 
or potential things to do? 
I would say: Why not require greater margins?  I think the margin 
requirements on credit default swaps are minuscule.  That would at least 
make people focus on what their exposure is, if they had to put up 
considerably more money to trade these securities. 
MR. MILLER:  Also capital requirement rules that [require] 
 
 211. See Bill McIntosh, Soros Urges Cleanup of CDS Market, HEDGEWORLD DAILY 
hat Created This Monster?, N.Y. 
s.com/2959/margin_require 
an, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
, Apr. 4, 
NEWS, Apr. 4, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 6392996 (confirming estimated notional 
value of approximately $45 trillion as of April 2008). 
 212. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, W
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/business/ 
23how.html (discussing derivatives as a “stealth market”). 
 213. See InvestorWords.com, http://www.investorword
ment.html (defining margin requirement as “the amount that an investor must deposit in 
a margin account before buying on margin or selling short, as required by the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Regulation T”). 
 214. Alan Greenspan, Chairm
Remarks to the Economic Club of New York (Jan. 13, 2000), http://fraser. 
stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/ag00/download/29043/Greenspan_20000113.pdf. 
 215. See Patrice Hill, Fed Faces Pressure to Deflate Markets, WASH. TIMES
2000, at B8 (noting that Greenspan stated that increasing margin requirements has little 
effect on stock prices). 
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in amount of capital on hand.216  Those went 
by t
ent; the investment 
bank
 as [he or 
she]
light
 margin; if a hedge fund can’t borrow 
in th
institutions to have a certa
he board.  And was the repeal of Glass-Steagall217 a good thing?  
You have banks that have never been able to merge their investment 
banking facility with their banking facility.218  The banking facility is 
based on a balance sheet and a financial statem
ing arm is fee-driven.219  So you have two different incentives in 
one institution.220  Sometimes the fee-driven part of the bank takes 
command and you get a . . . (I’m not going to name the bank). 
MR. NEIMAN:  I think this is going to be one of the largest 
challenges for [both] U.S. regulators [and] global regulators.  How do 
you keep up with innovation?  If you can keep up, is there a constraint? 
Even though I don’t have any teenagers, I think of it as: What’s 
your responsibility for supervision over a gifted teenager?  I assume 
you’ve got to give [him or her] enough latitude.  But as soon
 blows up the basement or drives the car off the road, you do have to 
exercise a degree of supervision. 
Same with capital and margin.  I think the two I would have high-
ed would be to what extent can leverage be used, as well as assuring 
that there is a safety net to ensure no systemic problems arise out of any 
failures. 
MS. SIEBERT:  I think it is a great time to try to get international 
securities regulations, specifically
e States, it goes to London, where it can borrow and it’s between 
[the hedge fund] and the bank.  Private equity – you can see deals being 
 
 216. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL 
STANDARDS:  A REVISED FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE VERSION 26 (2006), http:// 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf?noframes=1. 
 217. See Banking Act of 1933, supra note 50. 
 218. One of the main reasons for repealing the Glass-Steagall Act in the first place 
was to permit banks to engage in both investment and commercial banking.  See John 
Steele Gordon, Manager’s Journal:  May Glass-Steagall Rest in Peace, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 26, 1999, at A26 (“Glass-Steagall’s most important provision required banks to 
choose between being depository banks and investment banks . . . .”). 
 219. See Robert Parenteau, The Economics of Euphoria: Financialization and the 
U.S. Bubble, Prepared for the Political Econ. Research Inst. Conference on 
Financialization of the Global Econ. (Dec. 6-7, 2006) (first draft, Nov. 28, 2001), 
available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/parenteau.2.0.drft.pdf. 
 220. See id. 
2008 DESTEFANO LECTURE:   45 
 SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 
 
ime to have a regular poor quarter or two. 
rgin.  These are the 
thing
se same reasons.  But I think it is important 
to co
 can have lots of margin and capital requirements.  We have 
marg
o price instruments.  You can 
write
done at six, seven, eight, nine, ten times to one.221  It doesn’t give these 
buyers a t
I asked the head of one of the large German banks six months ago.  
He said, “Oh no, we don’t want your regulations.”  Well, they’re now 
talking, since they’ve had a few of their own institutions get into trouble 
because of the subprime.222 
I think it gives us a wonderful opportunity to set up international 
regulations on those kinds of things – leverage, ma
s that break us so fast.  All [the hedge funds] do is pick up and go 
abroad. 
MR. PREZIOSO: I am a huge fan of enhanced international 
coordination for a lot of tho
me back here.  I don’t think it is completely fair to all the regulators 
or the heads of these companies.  I’m not sure the criticisms of people 
like Stan O’Neal and Alan are so merited. 
You
in and capital requirements.  There are a variety of reasons why, in 
the international context, those are not meaningful.  There are a variety 
of reasons why, even without the international context, they are hard to 
apply.223  But all of them depend – and this goes to what I think is the 
most important thing here – on being able t
 capital rules to your heart’s content.  The banking regulators have 
been doing this for a long time. 
Curiously, of all the areas in which there is the most international 
cooperation, bank capital standards are probably the most developed of 
all of the systems that we have.224  It shows, I think, that even when you 
have a very good system, if you do not have markets that work in terms 
 
 221. See generally Stuart Washington, Bankers Beware, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 
Feb. 10, 2007, at 43 (discussing private equity and debt strategies). 
 222. See, e.g., Sub-prime Crisis Hits German Bank, BBC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7328694.stm. 
 223. See Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor, Cent. Bank of Malay., Keynote Address at the 
plementing BASEL 
 for Bank Capital Adequacy and 
Public-Private Dialogue Session of the 7th SEACEN Conference of Dirs. of 
Supervision of Asia Pacific Econs:  Cross-Border Challenges in Im
II in Emerging Economies (Aug. 4, 2005), http://www.bis.org/review/r050826d.pdf. 
 224. See generally International Guidelines
Management:  Hearing on H.R. 2043 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer 
Credit and the H. Comm. on H. Fin. Serv., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Donald 
Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.) (discussing the development of the revised 
international capital standards as well as its strengths and weaknesses). 
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stitutions, but you can only do it by taking away the 
oppo
r we 
have
es that are not anticipated.  What we see in 
the 
.  I came here to be educated.  So 
let m
MS. MORGENSON:  A collateralized debt obligation, which is a 
pool of pools.  A pool of mortgages, what’s called a residential 
of pricing and transparency, it is very difficult for any regulator or 
businessperson to make decisions that ultimately will not entail very 
significant risk.225 
Risk is inherent in what financial institutions do.  You can eliminate 
risk in financial in
rtunity for profit.  The only way you can be sure that the bank will 
always have the money when you come to withdraw it is for the bank to 
put it in a drawer in the back room and not lend it to the others on the 
panel for their mortgages or for any other purpose.  We know that. 
So to me, the focus on those items is, obviously, appropriate.  We 
need to think about whether the capital standards are right, whethe
 international coordination, which I think is critical here.  But I do 
think that focusing a bit on how one could enhance transparency in these 
markets, [as well as] what the [state and federal] governments can do to 
enhance that transparency, and to create incentives toward liquidity and 
transparency in the way financial institutions look at what they are 
doing, is an important step. 
We are never going to stop these crises.  We are never going to stop 
the system from having loss
stock market (at least in the United States) [is that] when prices 
collapse, you know what they have collapsed to.  I think that allows this 
kind of crisis to work itself through more quickly and more in tune with 
the kinds of tools for people (who I really think were acting in their own 
interest) to try to find these things.  I don’t believe that people inten-
tionally did things to embarrass themselves, to get themselves fired, etc.  
They just didn’t have the information because the market isn’t 
functioning in a way that delivers it. 
MR. KASWELL:  I think we are just about out of time. 
MR. MILLER:  I had a question
e ask a question.  What the hell is a CDO? 
mortgage-backed security (RMBS)226, that’s a pool of, say, thousands of 
 
 225. Cf. Reem Heakal, What Was The Glass-Steagall Act?, Investopedia.com, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp (asserting that more transparent 
nvestopedia.com/terms/r/rmbs.asp. 
markets lessen the possibility of masking unsound investments and assuming too much 
risk). 
 226. Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS), Investopedia.com, http:// 
www.i
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mort
f those kinds of pools in 
it.  S
] 
 problems.  
The 
. 
reat job. 
gages – your mortgage, my mortgage, everybody in this room’s 
mortgage.  A CDO has different combinations o
o it’s like an RMBS square essentially.227 
Then there’s [what is] called a CDO square,228 which is a square of 
a square.  So you are talking about some rocket-science debt. 
MR. MILLER:  And when you finally know what a CDO is, they 
change the acronym to something else. 
MS. MORGENSON:  L-O-S-S.  [Laughter
MR. KASWELL:  On that upbeat note, I do think we ought to re-
member that this is America.  We will work through these
markets will work together.  The private sector and the public sector 
will sort it out.  We will get through this
With that, I want to thank the panelists for a g
PROF. FISCH:  Please join us outside for the reception. 
 
[Adjournment: 7:33 p.m.] 
 
 
 227. Collateralized Debt Obligation, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia. 
com/terms/c/cdo.asp. 
 228. Collateralized Debt Obligation Squared, Investopedia.com, http://www.investo 
pedia.com/terms/c/cdo2.asp. 
